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Optimal Price-Setting in Pay for Performance Schemes in Health Care 
5 October 2015 
Abstract 
The increased availability of process measures implies that the quality of health care is 
in some areas de facto verifiable. Optimal price-setting for verifiable dimensions of 
quality is well-described in the theoretical literature on incentive design. We seek to 
narrow the large gap that remains between actual price-setting behaviour in Pay for 
Performance schemes and the incentive design literature. We present a stylised model 
for hospital price setting for process measures of quality and show that optimal hospital 
prices should reflect the marginal benefit of the expected health gains, the weight given ǯǡand the opportunity cost of public funds. Based on 
published estimates, we derive the optimal prices for three measures of quality that 
have been incentivised in the English National Health Service since April 2010 
(treatment in an acute stroke unit, rapid brain imaging, and thrombolysis with 
alteplase). We then compare the optimal prices with the actual prices offered to 
hospitals in England under the Best Practice Tariffs scheme for emergency stroke care.  
Keywords: Pay For Performance; provider behaviour; optimal price-setting. 
JEL: I11, I18  
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1 Introduction 
Pay for performance (P4P) schemes link provider payments to performance indicators of 
quality. They receive much attention from both policy makers and scholars. The empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of P4P is mixed. However, there is an emerging consensus that the 
key to effective P4P schemes is in their design elements (Epstein, 2012; Maynard, 2012; Roland, 
2012). These design elements include who to pay, what to pay for, the criteria for bonuses or 
penalties and how much to pay for each unit of increase in quality (Ryan, 2009). 
The size of the performance payments (i.e. the price, or the Ǯpowerǯ of the incentive scheme) is 
obviously critical, but has received surprisingly little attention in the applied literature. It has 
been treated mainly as an empirical question in ex-post evaluations of implemented schemes 
rather than as a key parameter that could be set optimally on the basis of economic theory. In an 
early review of the effects of P4P, Petersen et al. (2006, p. 269) stated that the "[s]ize of the 
bonus is probably also important [our emphasis]" and suggested that "the lack of effect or small 
effect in some studies may include the small size of the bonus [our emphasis]" (See also Cashin 
et al., 2014). 
Normative statements about the size of incentive payments in the literature on design choices 
have been extremely vague. For example, Conrad and Perry (2009 p. 361) suggested that the 
optimal incentive size should "follow the Goldilocks principle: not too little, but not too much", 
while Eijkenaar (2013 p. 124) stated that "[a]ll else equal, the higher the revenue potential for 
providers, the larger their response and the impact on performance, up to a certain point".  
Empirically, the size of incentive payments is often measured as a percentage of provider 
income. For example, the largest hospital P4P scheme in the US (the Premier Hospital Quality 
Incentives Demonstration (HQID) program) set bonuses and penalties as percentages (1-2%) of 
Medicare revenue (Das and Anderson, 2007). Similarly, the English adaptation, Advancing 
Quality, set bonuses of 2-4% of revenue for the associated activities (Sutton et al., 2012), and 
the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation framework determined that 0.5% in the first year 
rising to 2.5% of provider income be tied to performance on locally selected performance 
indicators (Kristensen et al., 2013). In their review of the literature, Conrad and Perry (2009) 
found that incentive sizes in the US varied between 2-9% of provider income.  
The theoretical literature on incentive design suggests that setting incentive payments relative 
to revenue is not appropriate. Rather, as we emphasize in this paper, a regulator should focus 
on the expected health gains of improved performance and the costs of these performance 
improvements when setting payments for performance. An extensive theoretical regulation 
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literature has investigated how to set optimal prices when health care quality is verifiable 
(Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998a, 1998b; Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 
1991; Kaarboe and Siciliani, 2011; Laffont and Tirole, 1993). The key insight is that price should 
be set equal to the marginal benefit of health care (discounted downwards for the opportunity 
cost of public funds and for altruistic motives of the provider; Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Chalkley 
and Malcomson, 1998a and 1998b).  Given the large increase in availability of indicators of 
quality, the assumption that many dimensions of quality are verifiable is not unreasonable in 
many areas of care (Eggleston, 2005; Goddard et al., 2000; Kaarboe and Siciliani, 2011). If 
quality is verifiable, it is still the case that the optimal price should be basically set equal to the 
(adjusted) marginal benefit of the verifiable quality (Kaarboe and Siciliani, 2011).  
However, the literature on optimal price-setting is purely theoretical, and no attempt has been 
made to compare the derived optimal price solutions with incentive schemes implemented in 
practice. This may explain why the optimal price-setting literature appears to have been 
neglected by the practical P4P literature.   
The aim of this paper is to make a first serious attempt at bridging the gap between the theory 
and the applied literature. We provide a theory model of hospital price setting for P4P schemes, 
and compare it with the actual implementation of such a scheme. Our example of actual price-
setting behaviour is the Best Practice Tariffs (BPTs) hospital scheme for emergency strokeȄa 
national P4P scheme introduced in the English NHS from 2010/11. BPTs are now the main 
vehicle for supplementing activity-based tariffs with performance related payments in the 
English NHS. We therefore build a theoretical model whose key assumptions match this scheme 
closely. The main feature of our model is that ǯ optimal prices should reflect the 
marginal benefit of the health gain associated with the incentivised dimensions of care.  
For our implementation, we searched the published literature for estimates of the health gains 
associated with the incentivised dimensions of care (treatment in an acute stroke unit, rapid 
brain imaging, and thrombolysis with alteplase). Using a monetary social value of a Quality-
Adjusted Life Year of £50,000 (previously used by the English Department of Health), we show 
how the optimal prices depend on the assumed    ǯ   
profits, and the opportunity cost of public funds.  
Our application relates to patients affected by stroke. Stroke is the second most common cause 
of death in the world, causing 10-12% of deaths in the western world (Donnan et al., 2008). The 
estimated total societal costs of stroke in the UK is £9 billion per year, including approximately 
£4 billion direct treatment costs, meaning that stroke treatment costs make up 5% of total UK 
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NHS costs (Saka et al., 2009). Timely and appropriate treatment of stroke is thus important both 
from an individual and a societal perspective.  
The framework presented here can be used to improve scholarsǯ and policymakersǯ thinking 
about price-setting for quality. Our analysis highlights the importance of setting prices based on  ǡ   ǡ        ǯ 
relative to profits. A key policy implication is that current incentive schemes appear either low-
powered      ǯ    ǯ   
profits. The interpretation that current schemes are low-powered is consistent with a recent 
review of existing P4P schemes which suggests that current hospital schemes (that pay up to 
5% of the revenues) have achieved very limited or no improvement in incentivising process 
measures of quality (Cashin et al., 2014, p. 86). 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the BPT incentive scheme for 
emergency stroke care in English hospitals. In Section 3 we provide a theory model for optimal 
hospital tariff setting in a context similar to BPTs, i.e. aimed at incentivising processes of health 
care for emergency stroke treatment. In Section 4 we simulate the theoretical model 
numerically and compare the result with the actual price set in the BPT incentive scheme. We 
end the paper with a discussion of our key results and venues for future research.  
2 Background 
In this section we review the information needed to setup a model that matches the key 
assumptions of the English BPT scheme including the financial incentives for quality before and 
after the scheme (section 2.1), the verifiability of emergency stroke care quality (Section 2.2), 
and provider performance on the incentivised dimensions of care before the BPT scheme 
(Section 2.3). 
2.1 Financial incentives for quality in the English NHS  
Hospital care in the English National Health Service (NHS) is provided through an internal 
market in which 211 Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) have the responsibility of 
purchasing health care for their populations from 160 Acute NHS Trusts (henceforth termed ǲǳ).  
The Payment by Results (PbR) framework links hospital reimbursement to activity through a 
fixed tariff per admission. Hospital activity is classified into a manageable number of 
homogenous, clinically-meaningful healthcare resource groups (HRGs) Ȃ the English equivalent 
of diagnosis related groups (DRGs). The tariff or price paid per HRG is usually set equal to the 
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national average cost of treating patients in a given HRG. The Best Practice Tariffs analysed in 
this paper represent a deviation from this rule (Department of Health, 2012a).  
Reimbursing hospitals on the basis of average costs has been shown theoretically to provide 
incentives for efficiency through cost reductions (Shleifer, 1985). If patient demand does not 
reflect quality it has been argued that these cost containment incentives may adversely affect 
the level of quality provided (Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998a). If quality is verifiable, however, 
a regulator can achieve the desired level of quality through contracting.  
The Best Practice Tariffs (BPT) analysed in this paper can be seen as an attempt to include 
verifiable dimensions of quality into the agreements between third-party purchasers and 
providers. BPTs were first introduced in the English NHS from April 2010 for four procedures. 
This was extended in the following years, and from 2013/14 BPTs cover more than 50 
procedures (Department of Health 2013). BPTs are tariffs that have been "structured and priced 
to adequately reimburse and incentivise care that is high quality and cost effective" 
(Department of Health 2013, s.61). This aim is pursued using a number of different pricing 
regimes, of which we will focus on the payment regime known as Paying for Best Practice. This 
regime is similar to the most common type of P4P today, in which health care providers are paid 
on the basis of their performance on process measures of quality that are assumed to be linked 
to better outcomes.  
In the financial year (FY) 2013-14 the Paying for Best Practice model was used for four different 
conditions: emergency stroke care; diabetic ketoacidosis and hypoglycaemia; fragility hip 
fracture; and transient ischaemic attack (TIA/mini-stroke1). This pricing model consists of a 
base payment for all admissions, plus one or more additional payments conditional on 
performance. In this paper we focus on the performance indicators for emergency stroke care.  
2.2 The verifiability of emergency stroke care quality  
Townsend et al. (2012) estimated that there were a total of 125,945 stroke incidences in 
England in 2009, while NHS England (2013), using a narrower definition of stroke, estimated 
that the median provider admitted about 400 stroke patients  in 2012-13. ǲǳ in the blood supply 
to the brain. The most common type of stroke is ischaemic stroke (representing approximately 
80% of emergency strokes). Ischaemic strokes are caused by a blood clot narrowing or blocking 
the blood supply to the brain leading to the death of brain cells due to lack of oxygen. The less 
                                                             
1 A TIA is a temporary disruption of the blood flow to the brain and cause similar symptoms as 
emergency stroke, but the symptoms resolve within 24 hours.  
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common haemorrhagic stroke is caused by a bursting of blood vessels leading to damaging 
bleeding into the brain (Department of Health, 2007a).  
Untreated stroke typically leads to a loss of 1.9 million neurons (brain cells) per minute, so 
stroke treatment should be initiated as early as possible (Department of Health, 2007a). The 
appropriate treatment of stroke depends on whether the stroke is ischaemic or haemorrhagic, 
which can be determined by an experienced health care professional on the basis of either a 
computed tomography (CT) scan or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). If the stroke is 
ischaemic, within 4.5 hours from the stroke, an attempt can be made to dissolve the blood clot 
medically in a procedure known as thrombolysis with alteplase. It is of key importance that 
alteplase is not administered to patients with an haemorrhagic stroke, in which case the 
treatment could be fatal.   
There is good clinical consensus on what constitutes high quality care for emergency stroke 
patients. In England, National Clinical Guidelines for Stroke were first published in 2000 and 
have recently been published in their fourth edition (Intercollegiate Stroke Working Party 
2012). The Department of Health published a National Stroke Strategy in 2007 (Department of 
Health, 2007a). The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence published a guideline for 
interventions in the acute stage of stroke and transient ischaemic attack (TIA) in 2008 based on 
clinical and economic evidence and expert consensus (National Collaborating Centre for Chronic 
Conditions 2008). This was backed up by publication of a quality standard in 2010 (NICE 2010) 
and a NICE pathwayȄa visual representation of the NICE guidelines and quality statements in 
the form of online interactive topic-based diagrams.  
In addition, the verifiability of stroke care quality is high and increasing. Until recently, the 
quality of stroke care was monitored on a range of key indicators for samples of patients in 
biennial and quarterly reports (The National Sentinel Stroke Audit (NSSA) published from 1998 
to 2010; The Stroke Improvement National Audit Programme (SINAP) from 2010 to 2012). The 
Sentinel Stroke National Audit Programme (SSNAP), for which data collection started in 2012, 
will provide a minimum dataset with process and outcome data for all stroke patients in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland which include the indicators on the NICE quality standard 
and the NHS Outcomes Framework.  
The detailed coverage of all patients means that emergency stroke care can now reasonably be 
assumed to be fully verifiable in some key quality dimensions which, in principle, allows for 
very detailed contracts to be written. Notably, the National Clinical Guideline for stroke contains 
recommendations for Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) on how to purchase stroke care.  
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2.3 Best practice tariffs for emergency stroke 
The BPT for stroke uses the high verifiability of stroke care quality to include quality in the 
contract arrangements between purchasers and providers. The BPTs for stroke are designed 
with the intention of supporting the key components of clinical best practice in the acute phase 
of the stroke following the recommendations of the NICE clinical guidelines and the National 
Stroke Strategy.  Specifically the tariffs incentivise the treatment of patients in an acute stroke 
unit, rapid performance of brain imaging and administration of thrombolysis, if appropriate.  
The tariffs are designed as a base tariff paid for all stroke patients irrespective of performance, 
and extra payments for a) rapid brain imaging, b) treating the patient in an acute stroke unit, 
and 3) alteplase (see table A.1 for a full description of the indicators). Alteplase was already 
paid for separately on top of the stroke tariff from 2008/09 and was not formally considered a 
part of the BPT scheme in the first two years of the programme. From 2012/13 the level of the 
separate alteplase payment was kept the same but considered a part of the BPT for emergency 
stroke.  
2.4 Provider performance on the incentivised dimensions of stroke care quality           ǯ   
indicators incentivised in the BPT scheme before and after its implementation. In the following, 
we describe performance on some indicators related to the incentivised dimensions of care. We 
do not attempt to evaluate whether improvements in performance after the introduction of BPT 
are attributable to the introduction of the P4P scheme. An earlier evaluation did not find this to 
be the case (McDonald et al., 2012). 
2.4.1 Stroke care delivered in an acute stroke unit 
According to the NSSA, in 2008, 59% of English stroke patients spend at least 90% of their time 
on a stroke unit (Royal College of Physicians 2011; Royal College of Physicians 2009). This 
proportion increased to 62% in 2010.  Column 2 of Table 1 shows that this increase continued 
steadily over time. There is however, sign of a stabilisation around 85% towards the end of the 
period, which possibly reflects capacity constrains with the current level of acute stroke units. 
Note that the definition of stroke unit used for these data is broader than what is required to 
satisfy the requirement for the BPT (the BPT incentivises admission to acute stroke unit as 
defined in Table A.1).  
2.4.2 Rapid Brain Imaging 
According to the NSSA (Royal College of Physicians 2011; Royal College of Physicians 2009; 
Royal College of Physicians 2007), the percentage of patients who had a brain scan carried out 
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within 24 hours from arrival at hospital increased from 42% in 2006 to 59% in 2008 and to 
70% in 2010. The percentage of patients who had a brain scan carried out within 3 hours 
increased from 9% in 2007 to 21% in 2008 and 25% in 2010. Columns 3Ȅ5 of Table 1 show 
some continued improvement in scanning times, but again, especially for a scan within 24 hours 
of arrival, performance seems to stagnate at around 90% of patients scanned within this time. 
Note however, that these numbers do not provide information as to whether all patients eligible 
according to the brain imaging guide incentivised by the BPT were scanned  as quickly as 
possible.   
2.4.3 Thrombolysis by alteplase 
Column 6 of Table 1 shows an increase in the proportion of patients eligible for thrombolysis 
who are thrombolysed, although the increase was most rapid in the first three quarters. Due to 
the non-mandatory participation in SINAP, the estimates could be biased by selection into the 
SINAP audit on which these numbers are based.   
Table 1: Hospital performance on indicators close to the quality dimensions incentivised  
by Best Practice tariffs  
Financial year and 
quarter 
% of 
patients 
that spend 
at least 
90% of 
time on a 
stroke 
unita 
% of patients 
who receive a 
brain scan within Median time 
(minutes) 
between 
arrival and 
first brain 
scan 
% of patients  
eligible for 
thrombolysis 
who are 
thrombolysed 
 
1 hour 24 hours 
2011-12 Q1 80 25 82 218 44 
2011-12 Q2 84 28 86 237 49 
2011-12 Q3 85 31 90 208 60 
2011-12 Q4 83 31 91 196 58 
2012-13 Q1 86 34 91 157 64 
2012-13 Q2 87 36 92 135 63 
2012-13 Q3 86 37 92 129 65 
Source: The Intercollegiate Stroke Working Party (2013) and NHS England (2013). 
Note: a) These data relate to the broad definition of stroke units, not the narrower definition of acute 
stroke units used for the BPT (See table A.2 for definitions). 
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3 A model for optimal price-setting for verifiable quality 
In this section we present a model of optimal price-setting in a context similar to the BPT for 
emergency stroke. We focus on price-setting for verifiable process indicators of quality for 
stroke emergency care. We first describe in Section 3.1 a model of hospital decision making and ǯǤ ?Ǥ ?
we derive the optimal prices set by the regulator.  
Throughout the analysis we assume that it is the hospital as a whole that takes decisions over 
quality choices, and these are not chosen unilaterally by the doctors. Hospitals are complex 
organisations and the decisions made are the outcome of the involvement of several parties,  ǯ     and potential deficits or surpluses (see 
fuller discussion below). 
 
3.1 The hospital 
We assume that each hospital receives a basic tariff p0 for every patient admitted with a stroke. 
The number of patients admitted with a stroke is assumed to be exogenous since stroke 
requires emergency treatment.  
Hospitals provide four different dimensions of services to stroke patients where the type of care 
is denoted with i=0,1,2,3.  We assume that three out of the four dimensions are incentivised by 
the regulator (when i=1,2,3). All patients receive the basic care (service 0). The hospital receives 
three additional payments p1, p2  and p3 for three incentivised dimensions of care: rapid brain 
imaging (service 1), thrombolysis with alteplase (service 2) and delivery in an acute stroke unit 
(service 3). The number of services provided in each dimension of quality is Ni  ? 0 . The 
number of services provided may in general differ from the number of patients since a patient 
may receive more than one service (as highlighted in more detail below). 
Patientǯ benefit depends on the services received. There are potentially 8 possible 
combinations of types of care that a patient could receive: basic services only (type 0); basic 
services and rapid brain imaging (type 1); basic services and thrombolysis with alteplase (type 
2); basic services and delivery in an acute stroke unit (type 3); basic services, rapid brain 
imaging and thrombolysis with alteplase (denoted with type 12); basic services, rapid brain 
imaging and delivery in stroke unit (denoted with type 13); basic services, thrombolysis with 
alteplase and delivery in an acute stroke unit (denoted with type 23); and basic services, rapid 
brain imaging,  thrombolysis with alteplase and delivery in an acute stroke unit (denoted with 
type 123). 
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Alteplase administered to patients with an haemorrhagic stroke can be fatal. Hence, the drug 
should not be given without conducting rapid brain imaging first. We therefore ignore types 2 
and 23.2     ǯ benefit from basic care is  ܾ଴ and that the additional benefit 
(on top of the benefit from basic care) from each of the five residual combinations of services is ܾ௜ with i =  1, 3, 12, 13, 123. Moreover, we assume that the additional benefit from delivery in an 
acute stroke unit is separable so that ܾଵଶଷ ൌ ܾଵଶ ൅ ܾଷ and ܾଵଷ ൌ ܾଵ ൅ ܾଷ.  
Define ݊௜ as the number of patients for each of the six possible combinations of services (with i 
= 0, 1, 3, 12, 13, 123).  ݊଴ patients do not receive any of the three incentivised services. ݊ଵ 
includes patients who receive brain imaging only.  ݊ଷ includes patients who are admitted in a 
stroke unit.  ݊ଵଶ refers to the number of patients who are considered for alteplase treatment and 
therefore also require brain imaging. Similarly, ݊ଵଶଷ refers to the number of patients considered 
for alteplase in a stroke unit and also require brain imaging. Since alteplase can be administered 
only after brain imagining and is safe only to a subset of patients (who do not have an 
haemorrhagic stroke), we assume that only a fraction ߛ out of (݊ଵଶ +݊ଵଶଷሻ  are administered 
alteplase (and therefore have an additional benefit ܾଵଶ) and for a fraction ሺ ? െ ߛሻ alteplase is 
not administered since brain imaging revealed that patients had an haemorrhagic stroke. These 
patients have an additional benefit of ܾଵ (from brain imaging only).   
The total benefit of patients treated, denoted with B, is: ܤ ൌ ݊଴ܾ଴ ൅ ݊ଵሺܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵሻ ൅ ݊ଷሺܾ଴ ൅ ܾଷሻ ൅ ߛ݊ଵଶሺܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵଶሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߛሻ ଵ݊ଶሺܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵሻ ൅݊ଵଷሺܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ ൅ ܾଷሻ ൅ ߛ݊ଵଶଷሺܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵଶ ൅ ܾଷሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߛሻ ଵ݊ଶଷሺܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ ൅ ܾଷሻ, 
which can be re-arranged as:  ܤ ൌ ܾ଴ሺ݊଴ ൅ ݊ଵ ൅ ݊ଷ ൅ ݊ଵଶ ൅ ݊ଵଷ ൅ ݊ଵଶଷሻ ൅ ܾଵሺ݊ଵ ൅ ݊ଵଷሻ ൅ܾଷሺ݊ଷ ൅ ݊ଵଷ ൅ ݊ଵଶଷሻ ൅ ൫ܾଵଶߛ ൅ ܾଵሺ ? െ ߛሻ൯ሺ݊ଵଶ ൅ ݊ଵଶଷሻǤ 
We can further rewrite the benefit function as a function of the number of services provided ܰ௜ , 
defined above, instead of the number of patients treated (since recall each patient can receive 
more than one service). The expression simplifies to:  
                                                             
2 This is a simplifying assumption. We could alternatively endogenise the possibility that alteplase is 
given to an haemorrhagic stroke. However, this would make the exposition of the model considerably 
more complex without adding any new insights. In equilibrium we would have two groups of patients 
with a corner solution where types 2 and 23 are never provided. Since the health penalties are incredibly  ǡ ǯ in our model would be consistent 
with this outcome.  Moreover, since this is a basic mistake on the side of the doctor and easily verifiable, 
doctors could face severe personal penalties (such as a suspension) if this would happen.   
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                                              ܤ ൌ ܾ଴ܰ଴ ൅ ܾଵܰଵ ൅ ܾଷܰଷ ൅ ቀܾଵଶ ൅ ଵିఊఊ ܾଵቁ ܰଶǡ                                        (1) 
where ܰ଴ ൌ ݊଴ ൅ ݊ଵ ൅ ݊ଷ ൅ ݊ଵଶ ൅ ݊ଵଷ ൅ ݊ଵଶଷǡ  ܰଵ ൌ ݊ଵ ൅ ݊ଵଷǡ ܰଶ ൌ ߛሺ݊ଵଶ ൅ ݊ଵଶଷሻǡܰଷ ൌ ݊ଷ ൅݊ଵଷ ൅ ݊ଵଶଷǤ 3  In words, every patient receives the basic care.  ܰଵ patients receive and benefit 
from brain imaging without being considered for alteplase.  ܰଷ patients benefit from delivery in 
a stroke unit.  ܰଶ patients receive both brain imaging and alteplase.4 There are also ଵିఊఊ ܰଶ 
patients who received brain imaging since potential users of alteplase but then do not receive it 
because brain imaging suggests that it is not appropriate for them. These patients still receive 
some benefits from brain imaging (which is equal to ܾଵ).  
The revenues of the hospitals, denoted by R,  are a function of the services provided:   ܴ ൌ ݊଴݌଴ ൅ ݊ଵሺ݌଴ ൅ ݌ଵሻ ൅ ݊ଷሺ݌଴ ൅ ݌ଷሻ ൅ ߛ݊ଵଶሺ݌଴ ൅ ݌ଵ ൅ ݌ଶሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߛሻ ଵ݊ଶሺ݌଴ ൅ ݌ଵሻ ൅݊ଵଷሺ݌଴ ൅ ݌ଵ ൅ ݌ଷሻ ൅ ߛ݊ଵଶଷሺ݌଴ ൅ ݌ଵ ൅ ݌ଶ ൅ ݌ଷሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߛሻ ଵ݊ଶଷሺ݌଴ ൅ ݌ଵ ൅ ݌ଷሻ, 
which can be re-arranged as: ܴ ൌ ݌଴ሺ݊଴ ൅ ݊ଵ ൅ ݊ଷ ൅ ݊ଵଶ ൅ ݊ଵଷ ൅ ݊ଵଶଷሻ ൅ ݌ଵሺ݊ଵ ൅ ݊ଵଶ ൅ ݊ଵଷ ൅ ݊ଵଶଷሻ ൅݌ଶߛሺ݊ଵଶ ൅ ݊ଵଶଷሻ ൅ ݌ଷሺ݊ଷ ൅ ݊ଵଷ ൅ ݊ଵଶଷሻǤ 
Analogously to the benefit function, we can further rewrite the revenues as a function of the 
number of services provided ܰ௜  (instead of patients treated):  
                                                    ܴ ൌ ݌଴ܰ଴ ൅ ݌ଵሺܰଵ ൅ ேమఊ ሻ ൅ ݌ଶܰଶ ൅ ݌ଷܰଷǤ                                              (2)  
The cost function of each service i  is  ܿ௜ܰ௜ ൅ ܭ௜൫ܰ௜൯ ൅ ܨ௜  with ܿ௜>0,  ܭ௜ᇱ൫ܰ௜൯ ൐  ?,  ܭ௜ᇱᇱ൫ܰ௜൯ ൐  ?.   ܨ௜ is a fixed cost (for example the fixed cost of setting up a stroke unit or the fixed cost 
associated to an MRI machine).  ܿ௜ is a constant marginal-cost component (for example the unit 
cost of administering alteplase or unit cost of a CT scan).  ܭ௜൫ܰ௜൯  includes monetary and non-
monetary costs of providing the service. The increasing marginal cost assumption is justified by 
capacity constraints on beds and the fixed number of personnel of the hospital.5 
                                                             
3 To obtain the last term in the benefit function we have used ሺ݊ଵଶ ൅ ݊ଵଶଷሻ ൌ ܰଶȀߛ. 
4 Notice that although both ܰଵ patients and ܰଶ patients receive brain imaging, ܰଵ and ܰଶ are separate 
choice variables for the hospital.  The first acts on the pool of patients who do not need alteplase but for 
whom a brain imaging is useful to the patient (for example to improve diagnosis).  
5 We could use a more parsimonious notation of the cost function of the type ܥ௜ሺܰ௜ሻ  which accounts for 
both fixed and variable costs. Splitting in its three components makes it is easier to relate the model to the 
application below.    
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We assume that the total cost, denoted by C,  is additively separable in the three services, and 
therefore the total cost function of the hospital is:  ܥ ൌ ܿଵ ቀܰଵ ൅  ଵఊ ܰଶቁ ൅ ܭଵ ቀܰଵ ൅ ଵఊ ܰଶቁ ൅ ܨଵ +ܿଶܰଶ ൅ ܭଶሺܰଶሻ ൅ ܨଶ ൅ ܿଷܰଷ ൅ ܭଷሺܰଷሻ ൅ ܨଷ.   (3) 
The financial surplus, denoted with Ɏ, is equal to Ɏ ?-C. 
3.1.1 Hospital payoff function 
We assume that hospitals are motivated         ǯǤȽǯ   Ǥ Analytically, we assume that the ǯ utility is separable 
and additive in profits and in the motivation component:  
                                                                                               ?Ƚ ? Ɏ .                                                               (4) 
This specification is standard and in line with the seminal papers by Ellis and McGuire (1986) 
and Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a) and current health and public economics literature6. 
Equation (4) can be interpreted as the reduced form of the payoff function of a complex hospital 
organisation involving different key agents working within the hospital, such as the physicians 
and the hospital managers. Different agents will have a different payoff functions within the 
hospital, but they will ultimately have to agree on the level of quality to be provided as a result 
of a negotiation process.  ǯ(due to 
altruistic concerns) and managers maximise profits. We can think of the payoff function, Ƚ ? Ɏ,  
as the sum of the payoffs of the different agents within the hospital where Ƚcan be interpreted 
as a parameter which is proportional to the relative bargaining power of doctors versus the 
managers. In this specific example, a value of Ƚ less than one implies that managers have a 
stronger influence in the decision process compared to doctors. In practice, the decisions may 
be less clear-cut with managers also cǯǡ
importance to costs, despite being salaried (if for example, they are concerned that the hospital 
may be closed or subject to strict monitoring if a deficit arises). This will reduce differences 
                                                             
6 Amongst health economics papers see Eggleston (2005), Heyes (2005), Jack (2005), Choné and Ma 
(2011), Kaarbøe and Siciliani (2011). Amongst public economics papers see Besley and Ghatak (2006, 
2005), Dixit (2005), Murdock (2002), Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006), Delfgaauw and Dur (2008, 2007), 
Glazer (2004), Makris (2009), Brekke et al. (2011) and Siciliani et al. (2013) 
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between the quality desired by the doctor and the managers but would still be consistent with 
the suggested payoff function.7  
The scenario described matches with the institutional setting in the English National Health 
Service. In England hospital physicians are salaried employees of the hospital, and so there is no 
link between the P4P bonuses received by the hospital and the personal income of physicians. 
The hospital may choose to redistribute received bonuses to the departments generating the 
income, but there is no requirement for them to do so. Still, it is reasonable to expect hospital 
managers to monitor that policies are implemented to ensure alignment between the external 
reimbursement incentives and the effort of individual physicians. This is already a part of the 
normal duties of hospital management that face substantial personal incentives to keep budgets 
(or hospital managers may lose their jobs) and there is no reason to expect that financial 
incentives in the form of P4P are any different in that respect. 
Note that high degree of altruism on the side of the physicians is not incompatible with low ȽǯǤ8 As ǡȽ ? ?Ǥ ? ?
and moderately motivated managers to contain costs, or equally a situation where physicians 
only maximise patientsǯ benefit but managers have a strong influence on containing costs.  
Although the parameter Ƚ has often been interpreted as related to ǯ ǡ 
parameter could encompass other sources of motivation, such as reputational concerns, peer 
pressure, fear of malpractice suits and other pre-existing internal auditing mechanisms within 
the hospital.  Higher levels of Ƚ 
provide quality on top of the pay-for-performance scheme. In summary, we interpret Ƚ as the 
relative weǯǯǤ 
                                                             
7 Although modelling the bargaining process is outside of the scope of this analysis and would be a 
contribution to the literature on its own, we could think as the current approach as the result of a 
cooperative Nash-bargaining outcome (Nash, 1953). In practice, there may be several ways to model such 
negotiations (eg cooperative versus non-cooperative bargaining) and much more structure on the details 
of the negotiations would have to be put in place (especially, in a non-cooperative set-up; (Osborne and 
Rubinstein, 1990)).  
8 Using experimental data from medical students acting as physicians, Godager and Wiesen (2013) found 
significant evidence of altruism. More precisely, 26% had a level of altruism less than one, 29% had 
altruism not statistically different from one, and the remaining 44% above one. There is unfortunately 
very little evidence on estimates on ǯ   Ǥ     
 
Wiesen is very interesting, the sample is small and it is not clear how the results from students could be 
extrapolated to physicians in a working environment (e.g. subject to pressures exerted by the managers) 
and in different countries.  
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   ǯ   
status, i.e. whether the hospital has for-profit or non-profit status. Brekke, Siciliani and Straume 
(2012) model profit constraints adopting a payoff function of the type ܷ ൌ ߙ෤ܤ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߜሻߨ , 
where ߙ෤ is the weight given to ǯǤ The parameter ߜ is zero for for-profit hospitals 
and is positive for non-profit hospitals. This formulation is analytically equivalent to ours by 
simply re-defining ߙ ൌ ߙ෤Ȁሺ ? െ ߜሻ. The presence of profit constraints is therefore equivalent to a 
higher weight given to patieǯǤ 
As it will be shown below what matters for the design of the incentive scheme set by the ǯǤ
which leads to a given Ƚis less critical. Therefore, for our purposes it is not necessary to model 
the various agency problems that may be arise within a hospital in further detail ȋǯǯȌǤ 
We do not restrict the parameter Ƚto have an upper bound, though we show in Section 3.3 that 
a value of Ƚ above one implies that the regulator would set optimal negative prices, therefore 
eliminating the scope for pay-for-performance schemes. In other words, there is a value of Ƚ
sufficiently high that quality is above the one desired by the regulator.  
3.1.2 Optimal number of services chosen by the hospital 
The hospital chooses the amount of services for each type of care ܰ௜  to maximise utility U.  The 
hospital does not choose ܰ଴ because the number of emergency patients admitted as stroke is 
exogenous but can choose the number of incentivised services (rapid brain imaging, alteplase 
and admission to an acute stroke unit). ȋ ?Ȍǡȋ ?Ȍȋ ?Ȍȋ ?Ȍǡǯlem is to maximise: 
U = Ƚ ቀܾ଴ܰ଴ ൅ ܾଵܰଵ ൅ ܾଷܰଷ ൅ ቀܾଵଶ ൅ ଵିఊఊ ܾଵቁ ܰଶቁ              
                                                           +݌଴ܰ଴ ൅ ݌ଵሺܰଵ ൅ ேమఊ ሻ ൅ ݌ଶܰଶ ൅ ݌ଷܰଷ                                              (5) 
 െ ቀܿଵ ቀܰଵ ൅  ଵఊ ܰଶቁ ൅ ܭଵ ቀܰଵ ൅ ଵఊ ܰଶቁ ൅ ܨଵ ൅ ܿଶܰଶ ൅ ܭଶሺܰଶሻ ൅ ܨଶ ൅ ܿଷܰଷ ൅ ܭଷሺܰଷሻ ൅ ܨଷቁǤ  
The optimality (first-order) conditions for ܰଵǡ ܰଶܰଷ are:  
                                                           ߙܾଵ ൅ ݌ଵ ൌ ܿଵ ൅ ܭଵԢ ቀܰଵכ ൅ ଵఊ ܰଶכቁǡ                                                    (6) 
                   ߙ ቀܾଵଶ ൅ ଵିఊఊ ܾଵቁ ൅ ݌ଶ ൅ ଵఊ ݌ଵ ൌ ܿଶ ൅ ܭଶᇱሺܰଶכሻ ൅ ଵఊ ቂܿଵ ൅ ܭଵᇱ ቀܰଵכ ൅ ଵఊ ܰଶכቁቃ                (7) 
15 
 
                                                           ߙܾଷ ൅ ݌ଷ ൌ ܿଷ ൅ ܭଷԢሺܰଷכሻǤ                                                                    (8) 
The marginal benefit from the non-monetary component and price is equated to the marginal 
cost. The optimality condition on the number of patients receiving alteplase also includes the 
marginal (monetary and non-monetary) benefits and costs of those patients who were 
considered for alteplase but ultimately do not receive it. The second order conditions are 
satisfied under weak regularity conditions on the convexity of the cost function.  
 Equation (7) can be re-written as: 
               ߙሺܾଵଶ െ ܾଵሻ ൅ ݌ଶ ൅ ଵఊ ቆߙܾଵ൅݌ଵ െ ܿଵ െ ܭଵᇱ ቀܰଵכ ൅ ଵఊ ܰଶכቁቇ ൌ ܿଶ ൅ ܭଶᇱሺܰଶכሻǡ               (9) 
where the third term is equal to zero using equation (6). Intuitively, although an increase in the 
number of patients receiving alteplase generates benefits and costs from imaging, the marginal 
(monetary and non-monetary) benefits from imagining are equal to the marginal costs and can 
therefore be ignored in the optimality condition for alteplase, which therefore simplifies to: ߙሺܾଵଶ െ ܾଵሻ ൅ ݌ଶ ൌ ܿଶ ൅ ܭଶᇱሺܰଶכሻ. 
The condition on alteplase is intuitive and analogous to (6) and (8). The main difference is that 
the marginal non-monetary benefit includes the benefit from alteplase net of the benefit of 
imaging, since patients considered for alteplase would obtain the benefits from imagining even 
if imaging revealed that patients had an haemorrhagic stroke (and therefore would not be 
eligible for alteplase).   
 
3.2 The regulator       Ǥ      ǯ   
transfers to the hospital and the utility of the hospital, B-ȋ ? ?ɉȌ ?, where ɉ ? ?accounts for the 
opportunity cost of public funds.  
Substituting for U, we obtain ȋ ? ?ȽȌ- C -  ɉǤIt has been argued (e.g. Chalkley and Malcomson 
(1998a); Hammond (1987)) that this specification leads to double-counting of the benefits, 
which is due to altruistic motives. Following this suggestion, we eliminate double-counting and 
assume that welfare is given by W = B - C - ɉǤThis expression is intuitive. It gives the difference  ǯ   hospital costs minus the cost associated with raising public 
funds. 
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We assume that the purchaser designs the optimal contract subject to (i) a participation 
constraint,  ? ?; and (ii) a profit constraint, Ɏ ? ?Ǥ    motivated, the first 
constraint is always satisfied when the profit constraint is satisfied. Since leaving a profit to the 
hospital is costly for welfare (due to the assumption of positive opportunity costs of public 
funds), it is optimal to set profits to zero, Ɏ=0 and R=C. The welfare function reduces to W = B Ȃ 
ȋ ? ?ɉȌǤ 
The maximisation problem for the regulator is to maximise: ܹ ൌ ܾ଴ܰ଴ ൅ ܾଵܰଵ ൅ ܾଷܰଷ ൅ ቀܾଵଶ െ ܾଵ ൅ ଵఊ ܾଵቁ ܰଶ  
 െሺ ? ൅ ߣሻ ൭ܿଵ ቀܰଵ ൅  ଵఊ ܰଶቁ ൅ ܭଵ ቀܰଵ ൅ ଵఊ ܰଶቁ ൅ ܨଵ ൅ ܿଶܰଶ ൅ ܭଶሺܰଶሻ ൅ ܨଶ൅ܿଷܰଷ ൅ ܭଷሺܰଷሻ ൅ ܨଷ ൱Ǥ 
The optimality (first-order) condition for ܰ௜  ǯǣ     
                                                       ܾଵ ൌ ሺ ? ൅ ߣሻቆܿଵ ൅ ܭଵԢ ቀܰଵ௙ ൅ ଵఊ ܰଶ௙ቁቇǡ                                              (10) 
          ሺܾଵଶ െ ܾଵሻ ൅ ଵఊ ቈܾଵ െ ሺ ? ൅ ߣሻ ቆܿଵ ൅ ܭଵᇱ ቀܰଵ௙ ൅ ଵఊ ܰଶ௙ቁቇ቉ ൌ ሺ ? ൅ ߣሻ ቀܿଶ ൅ ܭଶᇱᇱ൫ܰଶ௙൯ቁǡ    (11) 
                                                       ܾଷ ൌ ሺ ? ൅ ߣሻ ቀ ଷܿ ൅ ܭଷԢ൫ܰଷ௙൯ቁǤ                                                               (12) 
where f denotes first best, and the second term in the square bracket in equation (11) can be set 
to zero using equation (10). This suggests that the optimal number of services is such that ǯǤ 
3.3 Implementation 
In the following we assume that the regulator sets prices only on the three incentivised services. 
We therefore take the number of incentivised dimensions of quality as exogenous.  In the 
Appendix, we show that the optimal prices are: 
                                     ݌ଵ௙ ൌ ሺ ? െ ߙሻܾଵ െ ߣ ቆܿଵ ൅ ܭଵԢ ቀܰଵ௙ ൅ ଵఊ ܰଶ௙ቁቇǡ                                                (13) 
                                     ݌ଶ௙ ൌ ሺ ? െ ߙሻሺܾଵଶ െ ܾଵሻ െ ߣ ቀܿଶ ൅ ܭଶᇱ൫ܰଶ௙൯ቁ,                                                  (14) 
                                       ݌ଷ௙ ൌ ሺ ? െ ߙሻ ଷܾ െ ߣ ቀܿଷ ൅ ܭଷԢ൫ܰଷ௙൯ቁ.                                                                (15) 
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      ǯ        ǯ
benefit. When such weight is higher, the regulator needs to incentivise the hospital less. A 
higher opportunity cost of public funds implies a lower optimal price. While prices 1 and 3 are 
proportional to the marginal benefit from the service, price 2 is proportional to the benefit from 
alteplase net of the benefit from imaging since, as already outlined in the previous section, 
patients considered for alteplase would obtain the benefits from imagining even if imaging 
revealed that patients had an haemorrhagic stroke (and therefore would not be eligible for 
alteplase). 
Note how values of Ƚlarger than one always imply negative optimal prices in the presence of a 
positive opportunity costs of public funds. The intuition is straightforward. Providers are ǯnefits fully into account. They also take costs fully into account 
through the profit motive. The fixed tariff is a lump-sum payment and therefore does not alter 
incentives to provide quality. The hospital  ǯ    Ǥ ro 
opportunity cost of public funds, the optimal price is zero since the optimal quality provision 
coincides with the first best. With a positive opportunity cost of public funds, costs are inflated ǯሺ ? ൅ ߣሻ and the provider chooses a level of 
quality in excess of the one desired by the regulator.  
Moreover, from the profit constraint which has to be satisfied with strict equality, we can 
compute the basic tariff 
                                                 ݌଴ǡ௙ ൌ ቄ෌ ሾܿ௜ܰ௜ǡ௙ ൅ ܭ௜൫ܰ௜ǡ௙൯ ൅ ܨ௜ଷ௜ୀ଴ ሿ െ ෌ ݌௜ܰ௜ǡ௙ଷ௜ୀଵ ቅ Ȁܰ଴.              (16) 
This condition simply states that the basic tariff is equal to the average cost net of other 
transfers to the hospital.  
4 Comparing actual and optimal price-setting in BPT for emergency stroke 
In this section we describe the implementation of our proposed (optimal) price-setting scheme, 
and the actual one adopted by the Department of Health. We then compare the actual tariff with 
the optimal tariff.  
4.1 Optimal price-setting for Best Practice Tariffs for emergency stroke 
4.1.1 Information requirements 
Equations (13-15) show that setting the optimal hospital tariff requires knowledge of the 
marginal benefit and cost of the incentivised dimension of care and the opportunity cost of 
public funds. We illustrate our results for levels of the ǯ    ǯ
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benefits relative to profits, ߙ, which vary between 0 and 1 (as mentioned in section 3.1.1 a value 
of Ƚ above one would imply negative optimal hospital prices). We present our estimates at 
plausible ranges of benefits and costs to illustrate the robustness of optimal prices to 
uncertainty about the benefit and cost estimates. We fix the opportunity cost of public funds at 
the plausible value equal to ߣ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? since this is consistent with previous literature and policy 
practice.9 
In the following we focus on obtaining plausible estimates for the marginal benefits of the three 
processes incentivised in the three BPTs for emergency stroke. For assessing the marginal 
benefit of the interventions incentivised by the BPT we use Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). 
As the BPT performance indicators for stroke are all based on clinical evidence, we searched the 
medical literature behind the national clinical guidelines and NICE guidance to find estimates of 
the per-patient QALY gains associated with the incentivised interventions.  
We focus on studies that present estimates of per-patient QALY gains as close as possible to the 
counterfactual treatment, i.e. the type of care an NHS patient would have received without the 
incentivized process of care. Where possible, we sought studies with a lifetime perspective on 
the benefits associated with the incentivised dimensions of care. We adopt the monetary social 
value of a QALY most often used by the Department of Health in its policy Impact Assessments 
of £50,00010 (Shah et al., 2012). 
4.1.2 Marginal benefit of treatment delivered in an acute stroke unit 
Saka et al. (2009b) used data from the South London Stroke Register and Markov modelling to 
assess the 10-year cost-effectiveness of emergency stroke care in a general medical ward 
                                                             
9 The seminal work on estimating the opportunity costs of public funds was carried out by Browning 
(1976) who estimated a value of ߣ between 0.09-0.16 for the United States which in subsequent work 
(Browning, 1987) was re-estimated to between 0.18-0.47. Although numerous definitions of ߣ exist 
(Massiani and Picco, 2013) there is consensus that estimates of ߣ depend on the specific tax regime and 
assumptions about how economic agents respond to new taxes.  While there are no published estimates 
for the UK, Ruggeri  (1999) estimated a value of ߣ for a small open economy of 0.13-0.18 using Canada as 
a an example. Some countries have guidance values of ߣ for use in national cost-benefit appraisals. While 
the UK Treasury Green Book (HM Treasury 2003) does not suggest a specific value of ߣ, a survey of 
appraisal methods for infrastructure projects in the Nordic countries (Lyk-Jensen, 2007) showed that the 
official value of ߣ  for project appraisal in Denmark and Norway is 0.2 and ߣ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? in Sweden. Considering 
the similarity of the UK to Canada and the Scandinavian countries we assume a value of ߣ of 0.2 in this 
paper.   
10 The Impact Assessment of End of Life Care (Department of Health, 2008a) explained that the £50,000 
figure was based on a projection of a 2004 estimate of willingness to pay for an additional life year of 
£29,000 by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The increase to £50,000 was 
justified by a wish to reflect price changes from 2004 to 2006, the older age and poorer life quality of the 
likely target group of DH interventions, and an upward rounding due to concern that the figure might be 
an under-estimate of the social value of a QALY. 
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compared to stroke unit care11. The study found an incremental QALY gain per patient of 0.472 
QALYs associated with care in a stroke unit. As the time horizon of the study was restricted to 
10 years and the average age of patients was 64 years, the QALY gain of treating patients in a 
stroke unit rather than in a general ward is potentially larger. When assessing the robustness of 
our results to the uncertainty around this estimate we follow the approach taken by Saka et al. 
(2009b) in their univariate sensitivity analysis and use QALY values of above and below 20% 
the central value.  
4.1.3 Marginal benefit of rapid brain Imaging 
Wardlaw et al. (2004b) used a decision tree and a deterministic model to compare the cost 
effectiveness of 12 different CT-scanning strategies.12 Usual care at the time of the study was to 
scan all patients within 48 hours. The strategy included in the study that was most similar to the 
strategy incentivized by the BPT was to ǲscan patients on anticoagulants, in life-threatening 
condition, or candidates for thrombolysis immediately, and scan all remaining patients within  ? ?ǳǤsociated with a gain of just 0.1 QALYs per 1,000 patients over a 
five-year period compared to usual care. Wardlaw et al. (2004) justified the seemingly low 
QALY gain by the high proportion of haemorrhagic stroke patients (85%) in the study 
population. For these patients the main treatment strategy is aspirin, which only needs to be 
given within 48 hours. The study assumed that just 4% of patients would reach the hospital in 
time to be considered for thrombolysis, and suggested that the cost effectiveness of scanning all 
patients immediately would be higher if the proportion of potentially-eligible patients was 
higher. Wardlaw et al. (2004a) further explored the sensitivity of their estimates to the 
assumptions of their model. While these sensitivity analyses suggested some uncertainty 
around the absolute level of QALYs gained from different scanning strategies, few of these 
suggested any uncertainty about the incremental QALY gain of 0.1 per 1,000 patients. Allowing 
the proportion of actual strokes in a population attending hospital with stroke-like symptoms to 
be 77% rather than the base level of 81%, suggests a potential  incremental QALY gain of 0.2 per 
                                                             
11 The Stroke unit studied in the paper admitted only stroke patients and was a mixed unit with 4 acute 
beds and 23 rehabilitation beds. The paper defined stroke units as units fulfilling at least 4 of the criteria 
set out for stroke units by the Royal College of Physicians (see the left hand side of Table A.2), but was not 
explicit about the configuration of the stroke unit from which the data was collected. It is unlikely that the 
unit fulfilled the stricter criteria of an acute stroke unit (see the right hand side of Table A.2) and the 
similar definition given by the DH (see Table A.1). Although this might suggest that the estimated QALY 
gain is in the lower end of what is being incentivised, it should be noted that the Cochrane review carried ǯ
of death, or death or requiring institutional care or death or dependency when comparing acute 
monitoring with acute non-intensive units. 
12 The analysis was carried out for a cohort of 1000 patients (age 70-74) and repeated for 1000 60-64 
year and 80-84 year old patients in teaching urban and rural general hospitals using data from a range of 
sources. 
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1,000 patients, and we use this estimate as an upper bound when exploring the robustness of 
our results to the benefit estimate.  
4.1.4 Marginal benefit of thrombolysis with alteplase if clinically indicated 
A deterministic cost-effectiveness analysis based on a Markov modelling simulation study of 
patients with emergency ischaemic stroke receiving alteplase within 4.5 hours of onset of 
symptoms (NICE 2012) found an incremental per-patient gain of 0.333 QALYs from alteplase 
treatment.13 The study considered lifetime effects of treatment, assuming no change in health 
status after 12 months (other than death). The probabilistic cost-effectiveness analysis from the 
same study suggested upper and lower bounds of 0.235 and 0.411 QALYs per patient.  
4.1.5 Marginal costs of incentivised processes 
Ideally, we would use estimates of marginal costs, which according to our model depend on the ǯǤAs estimates of marginal costs of the incentivised processes are 
not available from the literature, we instead compute the difference between the average cost of 
standard care and average cost of incentivised care from the literature instead. In the presence 
of fixed costs, the marginal cost is likely to be lower than the average cost. For each care process 
we discuss to which extent this approximation is likely to be valid and further explore the 
robustness of our results to the choice of cost estimate in the sensitivity analysis. We also note 
that with an opportunity cost of public funds of 0.2, uncertainty in costs (including from 
estimates of the marginal costs) have a relatively small impact on price. This is described in 
more detail below.  
For admission to a stroke unit we use the per-patient per-diem costs reported by Saka et al. 
(2009). Multiplying the difference in costs between the stroke unit (£164.80 per day) and the 
general ward (£114.80 per day) by the average length of stay (34.4 days) yields a per-patient 
cost of treatment in a stroke unit of £1,720. Note that this price may be an underestimate, since 
the BPT for emergency stroke requires patients to be admitted to an acute stroke unit, which 
requires more potentially costly characteristics to be fulfilled (summarised in Table A.1 and 
A.2). In assessing the robustness of our results to this estimate, we follow again the approach by 
Saka et al (2009b) and assess how an increase or decrease in costs of 20% affects our results. 
The Department of Health (2007b) suggest that the only additional fixed costs in a stroke unit 
                                                             
13 The estimate was submitted by the manufacturer of alteplase (Boehringer Ingelheim), but reviewed  by 
Davis et al (2012). The review noted that manufacturer failed to model the correlation between the risks 
of death and death or dependency but that this was unlikely to affect the incremental cost effectiveness 
ratio (ICER) of administering alteplase. In addition, Davis et al. (2012) commented that the utility values 
for patients in dependent and independent health states stays fixed over the lifetime not allowing for 
deterioration of health related quality of life over time. Davis et al. (2012) suggest that this may 
potentially favour alteplase over standard care, but also note that the model is not very sensitive to the 
utility values applied and so consider the effect likely to be small. 
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compared to a general ward is low-cost monitoring equipment. The largest component by far is 
the variable staffing input of auxiliary nurses, physiotherapist and assistant, occupational 
therapist and assistant, speech and language therapist, psychologist to ensure delivery of the 
stroke standards (24 hour access consultant stroke specialist input, continuous monitoring by 
specialist nursing staff, rapid access to specialist advice on neurointensive care and respiratory, 
swallowing, dietary and communication issues; see Tables A1 and A2). The fixed cost 
component is thus likely to be very small, and we conjecture that differences in the average cost 
are a good approximation of those in the marginal cost.  
We assume that the direct costs to providers of achieving the stroke BPT to scan patients within 
24 hours are the additional costs relative to scanning all patients within 48 hours. Wardlaw et al 
(2004) reported that the mean costs of a CT scan at 2000 prices were £43 in normal working 
hours and £79 after hours. Their model suggested that the cost of CT scanning patients was £47 
if required within 48 hours for all patients and £71 if all patients were required to be scanned 
immediately. We take the mid-point of these estimates as the per-patient cost of achieving a 
scan within 24 hours for all patients (£59), and therefore the additional costs to the provider 
per patient of achieving 24 hours compared to 48 hours is £12 (£59 minus £47). We follow the 
same approach for calculating upper and lower bounds of the marginal cost of more rapid CT 
scan based on cost estimates from Wardlaw et al. (2004) yielding a lower cost estimate of £8 
and an upper bound of £34. Cost analyses in Wardlaw et al. (2004) suggest that variable costs 
make up 49%-88% of the average costs per CT scan depending on the time of day. This suggests 
that the marginal cost is lower than the average cost, which we reflect in the sensitivity analysis 
investigating the effect of assuming lower costs. Given that labour costs make up approximately 
39%-85% of the average costs per scan (higher share for out of office hours) and the fact that 
the required increase in the rapidity of CT scans is likely to take place out of hours, we 
conjecture that £8 is a plausible lower bound of the marginal cost.   
For thrombolysis with alteplase we rely on the cost estimate from Saka et al. (2009) which 
reflects the additional cost of administering alteplase including the cost of the drug. Sandercock 
et al. (2004) suggested that the plausible range of cost for alteplase treatment is between £480 
and £1000. As the main cost components for treatment with alteplase is the cost of the drug and 
the nursing time taken to administer the drug, the average cost of alteplase treatment is thus 
unlikely to vary significantly from the marginal cost.  
We adjust all cost estimates to 2013/14 prices using the hospital and community health 
services price index (Curtis, 2014). 
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4.2 Optimal price-setting in Best Practice tariffs for emergency stroke 
Figures 1-3 present the implementation of the optimal best practice tariffs for emergency stroke 
as described by Equations (13-15) for plausible levels of benefits of the incentivised dimensions 
of care and for a given central estimate of costs (see Tables A3-A5 in the Appendix for exact 
monetary values).  
The optimal price is highest when hospitals are purely profit-maximising (ߙ ൌ  ?ሻ. In this case, 
the price should be set equal to the marginal benefit associated with the incentivised process 
(net of the marginal cost weighted by the opportunity cost of public funds) and, as a result, the 
benefit estimate has a substantial impact on the optimal price. For example, at the central 
estimate of a per-person QALY gain from admission to a stroke unit of 0.472, assuming a social 
value of a QALY of £50,000, the optimal price of admission to a stroke unit is £23,226.  
The figures show that the optimal prices decrease with the weight given to patients relative to 
profits ߙ. The result is intuitive. If hospitals give a higher weight to ǯthen they 
need less of a financial incentive to incentivise performance. For example, at ߙ ൌ  ?.8 the optimal 
price of admission to a stroke unit reduces dramatically to £4,346.  
The analysis therefore highlights the critical role of the     ǯ
benefits as opposed to profits, ߙ, ǯ, ܾ, in determining the optimal price. 
Assuming a social value of a QALY of £50,000, and considering ߙ ൌ ሾ ?Ǥ ?ǡ ?Ǥ ?ሿ and a given ߣ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?ǡthe optimal price at the central cost estimate for treatment in an acute stroke unit lies 
in the interval [£1,514, £ 27,946]; the optimal price for rapid brain imaging lies in the interval 
[£-3, £7]; and the optimal price for alteplase lies in the interval [£1,011, £20,382]. For treatment 
in an acute stroke unit and alteplase, ߙ matters relatively more, because the marginal benefit is 
substantially higher than the cost of carrying out the intervention. 
4.2.1 Uncertainty in benefits  
Uncertainty on the size of the benefits, as described in section 4.1.2-4.1.3, can have a substantial 
impact on prices especially at low levels of ߙ. For example, at ߙ ൌ  ?, the maximum optimal price 
for care in an emergency stroke unit is £27,946, assuming a social value of a QALY of £50,000 
and a per-patient gain of 0.566 QALYs and £18,506 if the marginal benefit of treatment in a 
stroke unit is assumed to be 0.378 QALYs per patient. The difference in the estimated QALY gain 
is thus carried directly over to the difference in the optimal price. However, when hospitals give 
a higher weight to patientǯ benefit relative to profits, e.g. at ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?, the difference in QALY gain 
is only partially reflected in the optimal price which would vary between £3,402 and £5,290. 
Similarly, for treatment with alteplase, if no weight is given to patientsǯ benefit (ߙ ൌ  ?ሻ the 
optimal price varies between £11,582 for a QALY gain per person of 0.235 and £20,382 at the 
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       ?Ǥ ? ? ?Ǥ  ǡ      ǯ 
increases (assume again ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?ሻ the variation in optimal prices is less sensitive to the QALY 
estimate, and would vary between £2,186 and £3,946.  
 
Figure 1: Optimal performance payment (£) for treatment in an Acute Stroke Unit at different 
levels of treatment benefits 
 
 
Figure 2: Optimal performance payment (£) for rapid brain imaging at different levels of 
treatment benefits 
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Figure 3: Optimal performance payment (£) for thrombolysis with alteplase at different levels of 
treatment benefits 
 
4.2.2 Uncertainty in costs 
Figures 4-6 and Tables A6-A8 illustrate how the optimal prices vary with the cost estimate at a 
given level of benefits. The optimal prices are relatively insensitive to changes in estimates of 
the costs for a given level of  ߙ. This is in contrast to Figures 1-3, which shows great price 
sensitivity in relation to changes in estimates in benefits. The result is due to relatively lower 
levels of costs (compared to benefits), smaller variations in uncertainty around costs, and the 
fact that costs are weighted by the opportunity cost of public funds. It is still the case that the 
level of ߙ has a considerable impact on the optimal price.  
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Figure 4: Optimal performance payment (£) for treatment in an Acute Stroke Unit at different 
levels treatment costs 
 
 
Figure 5: Optimal performance payment (£) for rapid brain imaging at different levels of 
treatment costs 
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Figure 6: Optimal performance payment (£) for thrombolysis with alteplase at different levels of 
treatment costs 
 
 
4.3 Actual price-setting in Best Practice Tariffs for emergency stroke 
When the English Department of Health introduced the BPT in the financial year 2010/11, it        ǲ         
reflect the costs of delivering  ǡǳ   -   ǲ Ǥǳ    ǲȏȐ ǥ       ǳ (Department of Health, 
2010a, p. 51).   
The BPT tariff was top-sliced from the basic HRG tariff implying that a hospital providing none 
of the incentivised services to any patient would make a financial loss. This can be seen in Table 
2. When BPT was introduced in 2010/11 the basic tariff reduced. This was further reinforced in 
the following years where the BPT for rapid brain imaging and delivery in the stroke unit was 
further raised in conjunction with a further reduction in the basic tariff. Using the figures 
provided in Table 1 for 2011/12 we can infer however that, compared to 2009/10, hospitals 
received on average larger payments, after the inclusion of the BPT. Therefore, taking into 
account the hospital behaviour in responding to the scheme, hospitals ended up on average 
with a financial surplus following the introduction of the BPT.  
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The tariffs and their development over time are described in more detail in Table 2. Between 
2009/10 and 2012/13 there were two base tariffsȄ AA22Z Non-Transient Stroke or 
Cerebrovascular Accident, nervous system infections or encephalopathy and AA23ZZ 
Haemorrhagic Cerebrovascular Disorders.  From 2013/14 new groups were introduced for 
patients with and without complications and co-morbidities. Co-morbidities are defined as ǲ            
complexity of the primary intervenǳǲȏǥȐǳ(Department of Health, 2012a, p. 22).  
While the initial BPT prices were calculated close to the costs of providing the service, the 
subsequent adjustments were justified by a desire to increase the incentive for delivering best 
practice (Department of Health, 2012b). Both before and after the reform, alteplase has been 
paid for separately in addition to the base-DRG tariff for stroke patients. When the P4P was 
introduced, the DRG payment was lowered. In the first year, the base tariff for patients with and 
without co-morbidities and complications (CC) was lowered by £253, while the available bonus 
payments (not considering alteplase which was paid for separately) was £475. In the second 
year, the baseline tariff was reduced by a further £383 for patients without CC and by £579 for 
patient with CC. Simultaneously, the incentive payment was doubled to a total of £950.  This 
development continued in subsequent years with further reductions to the base tariffs and 
increases in the bonus payment. In the final year, the bonus payment for alteplase was £828, for 
rapid brain imaging £399 and for treatment delivered in an acute stroke unit £1,026.  
Table 2: Actual prices (£) for emergency stroke care and incentivised dimensions of quality 2009/10-
2013/14 
Component 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 
 
Base tariff 
     
AA22Z 4,348 4,095 3,712 3,005  N/A 
AA22A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2,764 
AA22B N/A N/A N/A N/A 2,851 
AA23Z 4,411 4,158 3,579 2,987  N/A 
AA23A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,764 
AA23B N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,377 
 
Additional BPTs 
     
Rapid brain imaging 0 133 266 399 399 
Treatment delivered   
in an acute stroke 
unit 
0 342 684 1,026 1,026 
Alteplase 828 828* 828* 828 828 
Notes:  AA22Z: Non-Transient Stroke or Cerebrovascular Accident, Nervous System Infections or Encephalopathy.  
AA23Z:  Haemorrhagic Cerebrovascular Disorders. *A: with Co-morbidities and Complications (CC), *B: without CC. 
Source: Payment by Results guidance for 2009/10-2013/14. 
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4.4 Comparison of actual and optimal price-setting 
The Department of Health description of the scheme suggests that BPT tariffs are mainly set as a 
function of costs in combination with an added incentive that appears to be arbitrarily set.14 Our 
analysis highlights the importance of also considering the ǯ benefits of the incentivised 
processes ǯ. 
The current performance payment for treatment at an acute stroke unit is £1,026. At ߣ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? 
this is consistent with a weight given to ǯ profits ߙ between 0.92 and 
0.95 for the plausible range of marginal benefit from treatment in a stroke unit. Remarkably, for 
alteplase, at a QALY value of £50,000, the tariff of £828 is also consistent with ߙ between 0.92 
and 0.95.  
The performance payment for rapid brain imaging set by the Department of Health has tripled 
from £133 when BPT was first introduced to £399 in 2013/14. This price is not consistent with 
any positive levels of ߙ in our framework which suggests low or even negative optimal prices. 
This is because the major benefit of rapid brain imaging only arises for patients with an 
ischaemic stroke who can subsequently be treated with alteplase, which has a high benefit for 
these patients. Due to the high prevalence of ischaemic strokes (about 80%) and the high 
expected benefit for ischaemic patients, the incentive payment for brain imaging need not be 
very high.  
Aside from brain-imaging, there are two possible ways to interpret our results. First, the current 
tariff is optimal and       ǯ  ȋ
above 0.9); therefore the need to incentivise performance through financial incentives is 
limited. Second, that the current price-setting in the BPTs for emergency stroke appear 
relatively low compared to the optimal price, and higher prices could be welfare-improving. 
Which interpretation is correct depends on the correct assessment of the relative weight given 
                                                             
14 Specifically for stroke, the PbR guidance explains that the cost of the initial CT scan was originally paid     ǡ             ǲ Ǥǳ-by-step guide to 
calculating the national tariff (Department of Health, 2010b) further specified that reduction in the  
conventional tariff  relating to delivering a CT scan was £133 and that the tariff was reduced by an 
additional £120 to reflect the current compliance to the delivery  of care on an acute stroke unit 
estimated using data from the National Sentinel Stroke Audit 2008 and Vital Signs 14. The tariff for 
treating patients in an acute stroke unit was derived on the basis of the cost estimate of implementing the 
National Stroke Strategy from the Stroke Strategy Impact Assessment (Department of Health, 2007b)   
using the fraction of strategy implementation costs relating to delivering care in an acute stroke unit. The 
impact assessment based its cost estimates on the assumption that an additional 37% acute beds were 
required to ensure that all stroke units would have sufficient bed capacity to be run at an 85% bed 
occupancy rate which was assumed to be enough to allow 95% of all stroke patients to be admitted to an 
Acute stroke unit. 
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ǯfits relative to profits. The empirical evidence, as far as the authors are aware, 
does not provide an estimate of such relative weight.15  This would seem an area for future 
development to advance the design of pay-for-performance schemes.  
5 Discussion and concluding remarks 
This paper aims at bridging the gap between the theory and the practice of pay-for-performance 
incentive schemes. Price-setting has been treated informally in practice and the emphasis has 
been placed on the proportion of total revenue accounted for by incentive payments.  We have 
presented a model of hospital optimal price-setting of process measures of performance for 
stroke patients. We have compared the derived optimal price with the actual price set in the 
English NHS as part of the Best Practice Tariffs scheme from 2010/11.  
The main features of our model are that optimal prices should reflect the marginal benefit of the 
health gain associated with the incentivised dimensions of care, the level of hospital weight   ǯ enefit relative to profits, and the opportunity cost of public funds. In our 
implementation we have searched the medical literature for estimates of the health gains 
expected from delivering the incentivised dimensions of care. Using a monetary social value of a 
QALY of £50,000 (previously used by the Department of Health), we have described the optimal 
prices for treatment in an acute stroke unit, rapid brain imaging, and thrombolysis with 
alteplase in intervals depending on uncertainty of key parameters.  
Overall, the model provides a framework in which scholars and policymakers can consider how 
incentive theory should inform price-setting for quality. There is currently no good overview of 
how prices are actually set in pay for performance schemes, but the focus appears to be on the 
costs of delivering the process measures of quality. Our analysis highlights the importance of 
setting prices based on expected benefits, not only costs, and the weight which hospitals assign ǯrofits. Given the monetary estimates of the benefits are large, 
we conjecture that prices for stroke care in the English NHS are currently set below the optimal 
level. Alternatively, hospitals are assigning a weight to patientsǯ benefit which is above 0.9 and 
therefore close to the weight associated to a societal perspective which maximises the 
difference between benefits and costs (the latter weighted by the opportunity cost of public 
funds). This highlights the importance of obtaining accurate empirical e  ǯ
                                                             
15 As already discussed above,  Godager and Wiesen (2013) provide estimates of physicians level of 
altruism using experimental data from medical students acting as physicians. However, these do not ǯ
as hospitals. See Section 3.1 for a more detailed discussion.  
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weight given to benefits relative to profits in future research since this plays a critical role in the 
design of optimal incentive schemes.   
We conclude by briefly discussing some limitations and other avenues for further research. We 
have not considered the potential multitasking problem with respect to unmonitored or 
unverifiable aspects of quality of care. Although this cannot be excluded, the BPT incentive 
scheme covered all the key quality dimensions, leaving little as unmonitored. Therefore, we do 
not think that allowing for the minor dimensions of unmonitored quality would alter our key 
results. If minor unmonitored aspects of quality were complements, then we would expect the 
optimal prices to be marginally higher. Moreover, setting prices that take account of 
multitasking would require considerably more information (in addition to the heavy 
information requirements already included in this study), including the responsiveness of 
unmonitored quality to changes in prices for monitored quality and the benefits and costs of 
changes in unmonitored quality.  
The study does not deal explicitly with uncertainty and heterogeneity of patients. It may be 
argued that patients may vary in severity and the cost and benefit that arise from treatment. If 
benefits and costs were noisy and the provider had risk aversion or limited-liability constraints, 
the presence of uncertainty may imply prices being lower than under certainty. We do not think 
these issues are critical in our current application. Hospitals are large organisations and may be 
thought as risk neutral. Moreover, temporary deficits within some treatments can be 
compensated by profits in other treatments, and hospitals provide treatments across hundreds 
of distinct DRGs. In addition, strokes are common: over a financial year volumes will be high and 
highly predictable. The high volumes also imply that the average costs of heterogeneous 
treatments are likely to be stable with more costly patients being compensated by less costly 
patients.  This is also consistent with DRG pricing which is based on average costs, and prices do 
not differ across hospitals. Therefore, although the tariff may not exactly correspond to the 
price of a given patient, it will on average cover treatment costs. Finally, the processes 
incentivised by the P4P scheme are mostly routine processes, and thus while patient severity 
may vary, it is unlikely that this would affect the costs of administering alteplase (which is a 
drug), or taking a CT/MRI scan of the patient. The supply of services may only vary to some 
extent with patient severity in a specialised stroke unit. In contrast, uncertainty may be more 
relevant for incentives schemes tailored at small organisations, for examples family doctors 
working on their own or in small practices (e.g. the QOF scheme for general practitioners in 
England). Family doctors working on their own may be risk averse. If the volume of patients for 
the incentivised process is small and erratic, uncertainty may play a more significant role. We 
leave this for future research. 
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Uncertainty may also play a more prominent role for incentive schemes that are based on health 
outcomes rather than process measures of quality. The current analysis focuses on process 
measures of quality and this has been the key focus in the development of pay-for-performance 
schemes. It may be argued however that ǯ incentive schemes should be based on 
health outcomes, rather than process, since ultimately health systems aim at maximising health 
gains. In practice, schemes based on outcomes are still at an early developmental stage. 
Available measures of health outcomes on a routine basis are mainly based on mortality or 
readmission rates, which are very crude, imperfect and noisy. These do not capture the 
distribution of health gains but only the lower tail of the health distribution, when the outcome 
is as extreme as death. They are also irrelevant for most elective care where mortality rates are 
negligible or infrequent and readmissions are very low. Moreover, health outcome measures are 
more sensitive to the severity of the patients, where risk adjustment becomes paramount. An 
interesting recent development within the English NHS is the development of Patient Reported 
Outcome Measures (PROMs) which aim at measuring health gains before and after the surgery. 
However, these only apply to four elective conditions (hip and knee replacement, hernia and 
varicose veins).      ǡ ǯ   
subject to a range of measurement issues and for this reason policymakers are likely to privilege 
process measures of quality in the future.   
If reliable and robust health outcome measures become available in the future, policymakers 
will have to decide whether to incentivise outcomes, process or both. Incentivising outcomes is 
likely to generate more uncertainty in the payoffs: outcomes are noisier and they also depend 
on patiǯ ǡ         
cannot control. They entail a greater transfer of financial risk from the payer to the provider. 
The cost of an improvement in outcome is also unknown to the payer and cannot be used when 
setting the optimal price. This is in contrast to process measures of quality that are under full 
control of the physicians. This seems to generate a trade-off between incentivising outcomes 
versus processes. The choice between the two is likely to depend on the details of the treatment 
and measurement constraints. We leave the detailed investigation of these trade-offs for future 
research though we conjecture that each may be optimal for some conditions or treatments, and 
are likely to coexist in the future.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Best practice tariff for emergency stroke 
BPT component Description 
Stroke care 
delivered within 
an acute stroke 
unit 
 
Patients are admitted directly (intending to be within 4 hours of arrival in 
hospital) to an acute stroke unit (Or similar facility where the patient can 
expect to receive the service set out in quality marker 9 of the National 
Stroke Strategy16) either by the ambulance service, from A&E or via brain 
imaging. Patients should not be directly admitted to a Medical Assessment 
Unit. Patients should then also spend the majority (Defined as greater than  ? ? ?ǯer 
AA22Z or AA23Z) of their stay in the acute stroke unit. 
Urgent brain 
imaging for all 
suitable patients  
Initial brain imaging is delivered in accordance with best practice guidelines 
as set out in Implementing the National Stroke Strategy Ȃ An Imaging Guide 
(Department of Health, 2008b) . The scan should not only be done in these 
timescales but immediately interpreted and acted upon by a suitably 
experienced physician or radiologist.  A CT scan should be undertaken 
urgently if  (a) indication for thrombolysis/anticoagulation  (b) On 
anticoagulants and/or known bleeding tendency (c) Depressed level of 
consciousness (GCS<13) (d) Unexplained fluctuating or progressive 
symptoms (e) Severe headache at onset (e) Papilloedema, neck stiffness, 
fever. Otherwise a CT scan should be performed within 24 hours. An MRI 
scan should be performed if (a) Diagnostic uncertainty after CT (e.g. 
suspected non stroke pathology but unsure) (b) Atypical clinical ǣȋǤ ?Ȍǲǳȋ ? ? ?ȌȋǤ ?Ȍ
clinical suspicion of vessel dissection (c) Delayed clinical presentation (>7 
days after symptom onset) 
Alteplase Patients are assessed for thrombolysis, receiving it if clinically indicated in 
accordance with the NICE technology appraisal guidance on alteplase. 
Alteplase is a drug that can dissolve the blood clot. It must be administered 
within 4.5 hours from the onset of symptoms and should not be given to 
patients if brain imaging has indicated that the patient has a bleeding in the 
brain.  
Source: Department of Health (2012b) and Department of Health (2008b). 
  
                                                             
16 (a) all stroke patients have prompt access to an acute stroke unit and spend the majority of their time 
at hospital in a stroke unit with high-quality stroke specialist care  (b) hyper-acute stroke services 
provide, as a minimum, 24-hour access to brain imaging, expert interpretation and the opinion of a 
consultant stroke specialist, and thrombolysis is given to those who can benefit  (c) specialist neuro-
intensive care including interventional neuroradiology or neurosurgery expertise is rapidly available  (d) 
specialist nursing is available for monitoring of patients  (e) appropriately qualified clinicians are 
available to address respiratory, swallowing, dietary and communication issues (Department of Health, 
2007a).  
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Table A.2: Key characteristics of stroke units and acute stroke units  
Key characteristics of stroke units Key characteristics of acute stroke units  
x Consultant physician with 
responsibility for stroke 
x Formal links with patient and carer 
organisations 
x Multidisciplinary meetings at least 
weekly to plan patient care 
x Provision of information to patients 
about stroke 
x Continuing education programmes for 
staff 
x Continuous physiological monitoring 
(ECG, oximetry, blood pressure) 
x Access to scanning within 3 hours of 
admission 
x if not 3 hours, access to 24 hour brain 
imaging 
x Policy for direct admission from A&E 
x Specialist ward rounds at least 5 times 
a week 
x Acute stroke protocols/guidelines 
Source: Royal College of Physicians (2007). 
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Table A.3: Optimal performance payment (£) for treatment in an Acute Stroke Unit at different levels of 
treatment benefit 
  
Benefit estimate 
  
18880 19824 20768 21712 22656 23600 24544 25488 26432 27376 28320 
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 w
e
ig
h
t 
g
iv
e
n
 t
o
 



ǯ


 
 
0 18506 19450 20394 21338 22282 23226 24170 25114 26058 27002 27946 
0.1 16618 17467 18317 19167 20016 20866 21715 22565 23415 24264 25114 
0.2 14730 15485 16240 16995 17751 18506 19261 20016 20771 21527 22282 
0.3 12842 13503 14163 14824 15485 16146 16807 17467 18128 18789 19450 
0.4 10954 11520 12087 12653 13219 13786 14352 14919 15485 16051 16618 
0.5 9066 9538 10010 10482 10954 11426 11898 12370 12842 13314 13786 
0.6 7178 7555 7933 8311 8688 9066 9443 9821 10199 10576 10954 
0.7 5290 5573 5856 6139 6423 6706 6989 7272 7555 7839 8122 
0.8 3402 3591 3779 3968 4157 4346 4535 4723 4912 5101 5290 
0.9 1514 1608 1703 1797 1891 1986 2080 2175 2269 2363 2458 
1 -374 -374 -374 -374 -374 -374 -374 -374 -374 -374 -374 
Note: Assuming per person MC of treatment in Acute Stroke Unit=£1871 QALYs, Social value of a QALY =50,000, 
Lambda= 0.2 
 
 
Table A.4: Optimal performance payment (£) for rapid brain imaging at different levels of treatment benefit 
  
Benefit estimate 
  
5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 w
e
ig
h
t 
g
iv
e
n
 t
o
 



ǯ


 
0 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 
0.1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 6 
0.2 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 
0.3 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 
0.4 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 
0.5 -1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 
0.6 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0.7 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 
0.8 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 
0.9 -3 -3 -3 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 
1 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 
Note: Assuming per person MC of rapid brain imaging=£16, Social value of a QALY =50,000, Lambda = 0.2 
 
 
Table A.5: Optimal performance payment for thrombolysis with alteplase at different levels of treatment 
benefit 
  
Benefit estimate 
  
11750 12630 13510 14390 15270 16150 17030 17910 18790 19670 20550 
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 w
e
ig
h
t 
g
iv
e
n
 t
o
 



ǯ


 
 
0 11582 12462 13342 14222 15102 16482 17362 18242 19122 20002 20382 
0.1 10407 11199 11991 12783 13575 14817 15609 16401 17193 17985 18327 
0.2 9233 9937 10641 11345 12049 13153 13857 14561 15265 15969 16273 
0.3 8058 8674 9290 9906 10522 11488 12104 12720 13336 13952 14218 
0.4 6884 7412 7940 8468 8996 9824 10352 10880 11408 11936 12164 
0.5 5709 6149 6589 7029 7469 8159 8599 9039 9479 9919 10109 
0.6 4535 4887 5239 5591 5943 6495 6847 7199 7551 7903 8055 
0.7 3360 3624 3888 4152 4416 4830 5094 5358 5622 5886 6000 
0.8 2186 2362 2538 2714 2890 3166 3342 3518 3694 3870 3946 
0.9 1011 1099 1187 1275 1363 1501 1589 1677 1765 1853 1891 
1 -163 -163 -163 -163 -163 -163 -163 -163 -163 -163 -163 
Note: Assuming per person MC of treatment with alteplase=816, Social value of a QALY =50,000, Lambda = 0.2 
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Table A.6: Optimal performance payment (£) for treatment in an Acute Stroke Unit at different levels of 
treatment costs 
 
 
Cost estimate 
  
1497 1572 1647 1722 1797 1871 1946 2021 2096 2171 2246 
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 w
e
ig
h
t 
g
iv
e
n
 t
o
 



ǯ


 
0 23301 23286 23271 23256 23241 23226 23211 23196 23181 23166 23151 
0.1 20941 20926 20911 20896 20881 20866 20851 20836 20821 20806 20791 
0.2 18581 18566 18551 18536 18521 18506 18491 18476 18461 18446 18431 
0.3 16221 16206 16191 16176 16161 16146 16131 16116 16101 16086 16071 
0.4 13861 13846 13831 13816 13801 13786 13771 13756 13741 13726 13711 
0.5 11501 11486 11471 11456 11441 11426 11411 11396 11381 11366 11351 
0.6 9141 9126 9111 9096 9081 9066 9051 9036 9021 9006 8991 
0.7 6781 6766 6751 6736 6721 6706 6691 6676 6661 6646 6631 
0.8 4421 4406 4391 4376 4361 4346 4331 4316 4301 4286 4271 
0.9 2061 2046 2031 2016 2001 1986 1971 1956 1941 1926 1911 
1 -299 -314 -329 -344 -359 -374 -389 -404 -419 -434 -449 
Note: Assuming per person MB of treatment in Acute Stroke Unit=0.479 QALYs, Social value of a QALY =50,000, 
Lambda= 0.2 
 
Table A.7: Optimal performance payment (£) for rapid brain imaging at different levels treatment costs 
  
Cost estimate 
  
10 14 17 20 24 27 30 34 37 41 44 
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 w
e
ig
h
t 
g
iv
e
n
 t
o
 



ǯ


 
0 3 2 2 1 0 0 -1 -2 -2 -3 -4 
0.1 2 2 1 0 0 -1 -2 -2 -3 -4 -4 
0.2 2 1 1 0 -1 -1 -2 -3 -3 -4 -5 
0.3 1 1 0 -1 -1 -2 -3 -3 -4 -5 -5 
0.4 1 0 0 -1 -2 -2 -3 -4 -4 -5 -6 
0.5 0 0 -1 -2 -2 -3 -4 -4 -5 -6 -6 
0.6 0 -1 -1 -2 -3 -3 -4 -5 -5 -6 -7 
0.7 -1 -1 -2 -3 -3 -4 -5 -5 -6 -7 -7 
0.8 -1 -2 -2 -3 -4 -4 -5 -6 -6 -7 -8 
0.9 -2 -2 -3 -4 -4 -5 -6 -6 -7 -8 -8 
1 -2 -3 -3 -4 -5 -5 -6 -7 -7 -8 -9 
Note: Assuming per person MB of rapid brain imaging=0.0001 QALYs, Social value of a QALY =50,000, Lambda = 0.2 
 
 
Table A.8: Optimal performance payment for thrombolysis with alteplase at different levels of treatment 
costs  
  
Cost estimate 
  
522 579 635 692 749 805 862 918 975 1031 1088 
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 w
e
ig
h
t 
g
iv
e
n
 t
o
 



ǯ


 
0 16541 16529 16518 16507 16495 16484 16473 16461 16450 16439 16427 
0.1 14876 14865 14853 14842 14831 14819 14808 14797 14786 14774 14763 
0.2 13212 13200 13189 13178 13166 13155 13144 13132 13121 13110 13098 
0.3 11547 11536 11524 11513 11502 11490 11479 11468 11457 11445 11434 
0.4 9883 9871 9860 9849 9837 9826 9815 9803 9792 9781 9769 
0.5 8218 8207 8195 8184 8173 8161 8150 8139 8128 8116 8105 
0.6 6554 6542 6531 6520 6508 6497 6486 6474 6463 6452 6440 
0.7 4889 4878 4866 4855 4844 4832 4821 4810 4799 4787 4776 
0.8 3225 3213 3202 3191 3179 3168 3157 3145 3134 3123 3111 
0.9 1560 1549 1537 1526 1515 1503 1492 1481 1470 1458 1447 
1 -104 -116 -127 -138 -150 -161 -172 -184 -195 -206 -218 
Note: Assuming per person MB of treatment in Acute Stroke Unit=0.479 QALYs, Social value of a QALY =50,000, 
Lambda = 0.2 
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Appendix 
The three optimality conditions for the hospital and the regulator are respectively  
                                                           ߙܾଵ ൅ ݌ଵ ൌ ܿଵ ൅ ܭଵԢ ቀܰଵכ ൅ ଵఊ ܰଶכቁǡ                                               (A1) 
                                                    ߙሺܾଵଶ െ ܾଵሻ ൅ ݌ଶ ൌ ܿଶ ൅ ܭଶᇱሺܰଶכሻ                                                      (A2) 
                                                           ߙܾଷ ൅ ݌ଷ ൌ ܿଷ ൅ ܭଷԢሺܰଷכሻǤ                                                                (A3) 
                                   ܾଵ െ ߣ ቆܿଵ ൅ ܭଵԢ ቀܰଵ௙ ൅ ଵఊ ܰଶ௙ቁቇ ൌ ܿଵ ൅ ܭଵԢ ቀܰଵ௙ ൅ ଵఊ ܰଶ௙ቁǡ                     (A4) 
                                              ܾଵଶ െ ܾଵ െ ߣ ቀܿଶ ൅ ܭଶᇱ൫ܰଶ௙൯ቁ ൌ ܿଶ ൅ ܭଶᇱ൫ܰଶ௙൯                                    (A5) 
                                                       ܾଷ െ ߣ ቀܿଷ ൅ ܭଷԢ൫ܰଷ௙൯ቁ ൌ ܿଷ ൅ ܭଷԢ൫ܰଷ௙൯Ǥ                                        (A6) 
By equating the LHS of (A1)-(A3), with the LHS of (A4)-(A6), we obtain 
ߙܾଵ ൅ ݌ଵ ൌ ܾଵ െ ߣ ቆܿଵ ൅ ܭଵԢ ൬ܰଵ௙ ൅  ?ߛ ܰଶ௙൰ቇǡ ߙሺܾଵଶ െ ܾଵሻ ൅ ݌ଶ ൌ ሺܾଵଶ െ ܾଵሻ െ ߣ ቀܿଶ ൅ ܭଶᇱ൫ܰଶ௙൯ቁǡ 
ߙܾଷ ൅ ݌ଷ ൌ ܾଷ െ ߣ ቀܿଷ ൅ ܭଷԢ൫ܰଷ௙൯ቁ. 
The optimal prices are obtained: 
݌ଵ௙ ൌ ܾଵሺ ? െ ߙሻ െ ߣቆܿଵ ൅ ܭଵԢ ቀܰଵ௙ ൅ ଵఊ ܰଶ௙ቁቇ, 
݌ଶ௙ ൅  ?ߛ ݌ଵ௙ ൌ ൬ܾଵଶ ൅  ? െ ߛߛ ܾଵ൰ ሺ ? െ ߙሻ െ ߣ ቀܿଶ ൅ ܭଶᇱ൫ܰଶ௙൯ቁǡ ݌ଷ௙ ൌ ܾଷሺ ? െ ߙሻ െ ߣ ቀ ଷܿ ൅ ܭଷԢ൫ܰଷ௙൯ቁ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
